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Abstract. Does the legal system have a structure (according to sources and branches of law, 
general and special parts of codes, principles, rules and exceptions in regulation, etc.), or 
structuring is taken into it from the outside? And providing that it is taken, whoever is taking 
it? For neither principles, nor rules are given in themselves, separated from each other in a way 
classified in terms of the law's taxonomic systemicity as bearing their own separate meaning. 
All this can be but the result of a constitutive act. Based upon legal doctrines, it is judicial 
practice that builds different propositions into either principles or rules. Or, it is not logic itself 
that labels anything as a structuring element identified as either principle or rule but we, who 
ponder the mode of how to construct a sequence of distinction, deduction and justification 
conclusive enough to convince those controlling the issue we propose in the procedural 
hierarchy. Therefore the structuring features in law are construed and construing, constructed 
and constructing at the same time, for they do not and cannot exist in and by themselves at all. 
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The unquestionable hegemony of the idea of the positivity of law lasted until 
the third third of the 19th century on the European continent, all along the 
age of the exegetic application of statutory instruments, until the dawn of the 
movements of free law. Although re-codification was not effected in the 
second half of the 20th century—now disregarding the different direction of 
development taken by the socialist law—and the classical civil codes became 
gradually reduced, from their classical function of defining the law, to the 
increasingly passive role of being used as mere systemic locus-providers 
and locus-indicators of the direction and conceptuality taken by the judicial 
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law development,1 the legal doctrine has nevertheless successfully cut down 
the disintegration caused by the free law movement and maintained a 
positivistic domination for yet another century on the European continent. 
Though legal positivism was not shattered by the brief rebirth of natural law 
which took place after the Second World War (as a post-war German reaction 
to warmongering), finally, the way of posing questions in legal sociology in 
Europe (from the 1910s on, launched by Eugen Ehrlich), the American 
“realist” pragmatism (from the 1930s on, inspired mainly by Roscoe Pound), 
the transformation of the new English linguistic and logical analysis of law 
(from the 1960s on, initiated by H. L. A. Hart) into an American-type 
reconstruction of legal discourses (effective from the 1970s, represented by 
Ronald Dworkin), and, at last—as a stroke of grace—in Europe itself, the 
stabilisation of the so-called anti-formalist stand (formulated by Michel 
Villey and Chaïm Perelman) in the debate on law and logic and its progress 
into a reconstructive inquiry of legal processes, on the one hand, and the 
foundation of a continental theory of argumentation, cultivated almost as a 
substitute to legal dogmatics (mainly introduced by Robert Alexy and Aulis 
Aarnio), on the other—well, all these challenged the validity of unconditional 
adherence to legal positivism—even if exclusively in theoretical explanation—, 
moreover, made it outdated by the 1980s.2 In brief, what had seemed, just a 
few decades ago, to be a demand (guided by wishful thinking) of the “decline” 
of legal positivism, is now rather anticipated by several visions—instead of a 
stigma of decay—as the image of a positive escape forwards, resulting from 
having been transcended as transformed into something new, in a way, however, 
accompanied by a reassuring continuity.3 
 Nevertheless, the theoretical dominance of legal positivism in its era had 
offered two possibilities: notably, the acceptance of the actual definition of 
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1
 Cf., from the author, Codification as a Socio-historical Phenomenon. Budapest, 
1991, ch. V, para. 5, especially at 121. 
 
2
 For an overview, cf., from the author, Theory of the Judicial Process The Estab-
lishment of Facts, Budapest, 1995, ch. I. 
 
3
 For the decline, see, e.g., Villey, M.: ‘Essor et décadence du volontarisme juridique’ 
Archives de Philosophie du Droit 3: Le rôle de la volonté dans le Droit. Paris, 1958. As to 
continuity, it is characteristic that—only to take just one telling example—the editor of 
Transformation de la culture juridique québécoise dir. Bjarne Melkevik, Québec, 1998, 
Avant-propos, 7, had to leave his working hypothesis behind as unfounded. Albeit the 
sub-topic of the debate in question was heralded as „Est-ce la fin de l’hégémonie 
positiviste?”, it does not feature any longer in the printed collection of the proceedings, as 
the workshop has proven just the antithesis, namely, „l’hégémonie positiviste ne touche 
nullement à sa fin au Québec, pas plus qu’en d’autres lieux”. 
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the law by positive law in practical legal processes and the explanation of 
any kind of eventual difference as only an exceptional deviance, on the one 
hand, and taking the formal and official positivation of the law also as a 
theoretically descriptive conceptual criterion of legal phenomena, on the 
other. While the cutting back of the latter took place relatively soon as 
applied to the notion of juridicity itself,4 moreover, the former was also 
cut back in a conclusive way (as mainly replaced by explanation within the 
framework of the processes of an overall autopoietic system),5 paradoxically 
all this has not affected in nearly any respect the range of problems raised by 
“The Structure of Legal Systems”. 
 In the field of continental civil law, it seemed to be a self-evident fact, 
not questioned by anybody until the recent decades, that the structure of legal 
systems consists partly of their visible external division (according to branches 
of the law and, inside any of them, according to its formal sources)—that is, 
their division into individual branches of the law, including the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution, the appropriate code(s) and law(s), the eventual 
decrees and orders designed to ensure their implementation, as well as the 
judicial guiding principles, decisions for the uniformity of jurisprudence, 
and the individual judgements—, and partly of the internal (logical) self-
division
 of any legal (normative) regulation resulting from the axiomatic ideal 
of modern legislation, that is, the fact that regulation is mostly effected by 
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4
 As a programme and a realisation, cf., from the author, ‘Quelques questions métho-
dologiques de la formation des concepts en sciences juridiques’ [1970] Archives de 
Philosophie du Droit XVIII (Paris: Sirey 1973), para. 4, in particular at 223 et seq. 
[reprinted in his Law and Philosophy Selected Papers in Legal Theory (Budapest: 
Eötvös Lóránd University Project on “Comparative Legal Cultures” 1994), 7–33 
{Philosophiae Iuris}]. 
 
5
 Cf., as a philosophy of language reconstruction, from the author, Theory of the 
Judicial Process… [1987], passim, and ‘The Context of the Judicial Application of 
Norms’ [1988] in Prescriptive Formality and Normative Rationality in Modern Legal 
Systems Festschrift for Robert S. Summers, ed. Werner Krawietz—Neil MacCormick—
Georg Henrik von Wright, Berlin, 1994, 495–512. [reprinted as ‘The Nature of the Judicial 
Application of Norms (Science- and Language-philosophical Considerations)’ in his 
Law and Philosophy, 295–314], and, as a restatement characteristic of the critical legal 
studies, Conklin, W. A.: The Phenomenology of Modern Legal Discourse The Judicial 
Production and the Discourse of Suffering. Aldershot, 1998. xii + 258., respectively. 
It is to be noted that essays on the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries in Central 
Europe already explored such arguments for theoretical explanation. Cf., above all, 
Wurzel, K. G.: Das juristische Denken, Wien, 1904 [trans. Ernest Bruncken as 
‘Methods of Juridical Thinking’ in Science of Legal Method, Boston, 1917 (reprint: 
New York, 1969), 286–428. (The Modern Legal Philosophy Series IX)]. 
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general rules and particular dispositions in the general, as well as the particular 
parts
 of the law-code in question, on the one hand, and by established 
principles, main rules (disposing of the particular area of regulation), rules 
(breaking them further down in concretisation), exceptions (allowing concessions 
from these), as well as sub-exceptions (making additional concessions available 
with regard to their last specification), on the other. All this encountered 
no problems for a long time, because it was made visible exactly this way; 
however, also because a number of legal theories (including, of course, that 
of MARXISM) were trying to find (simplifyingly, viewing law as the reflection 
of something else, external to and outside of it, hence having to conform in 
features, structure, etc. to what it is a reflection of) a kind of correspondence 
between law and the spheres of (social) reality regulated by it, which is not 
merely instrumental and/or functional, but also epistemologically interpretable;6 
as well as because these theories took far too seriously the suggestion of all 
the positive law’s staff on the exclusivity of established juristic methods in 
legal processes. This was the shift in codification from the casuistry to the 
axiomatic ideal, the transition from the creative precedential induction (method 
of comparing, assimilating and distinguishing those precedents, taking the 
individual cases for a starting point), to the reproductive and mechanical, 
deductive rule-application
 (starting out from the mass of provisions at various 
degrees of generality of the code, construed as constituents of one logical 
system, following the axiomatic ideal).7
 
 What the DWORKINian theoretical challenge has made unambiguous is 
that there are principles in every system which are, as to their nature, not 
only different from the rules but, in fact, control the very policy of the 

 
6
 Cf., e.g., Samu, M.: A szocialista jogrendszer tagozódásának alapja [The basis 
of divisions structuring the socialist legal system]. Budapest, 1964. 268., and, as its 
ontological criticism, from the present author, The Place of Law in Lukács’ World 
Concept, Budapest, 1985 [reprint 1998], ch. 5, para. 3, especially at 123 et seq. 
 
7
 Cf., from the author, Lectures on the Paradigms of Legal Thinking, Budapest, 1999, 
ch. 2, para. 1, 9 et seq. [Philosophiae Iuris]. See, also from the author, as the first critical 
formulation of its primitive idea, with his proposition to transcend it, ‘A magatartási 
szabály és az objektív igazság kérdése’ [Rule of behaviour and the question of objective 
truth, 1964] in Útkeresés Kísérletek — kéziratban [The Search for a Path: Early Essays in 
Manuscript]. Budapest, 2001, 4–18. [Jogfilozófiák] and, as applied to the paradigm of 
basis and superstructure in Marxism, ‘Autonomy and Instrumentality of Law in a Super-
structural Perspective’ [1985] Acta Juridica Hungarica 40 (1999) 3–4, 213–235. 
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applicability of rules and, thereby, also their actual practice.8 Well, it is 
not by mere chance that, based upon this, it was in the United States of 
America, the flagship of politicised aspirations and expectations, that the 
practice known as constitutionalisation (subjecting any issue at will to get 
reduced to—for being inferred directly from—basic rights or constitutional 
values)9 had evolved. In parallel with this, as a result of the compromise 
between the needs in changing life and the technical availabilities offered 
by the law’s codification, after the Second World War the German style of 
legal dogmatics had, as its own construction developed from the practice 
based on general clauses, already definitely nourished a conception of 
law, defining it as a texture made up of principles and rules.10 
 However, as it can be told about the facts that they never get to the court 
by themselves, labelled and prepared for a syllogistic inference from the 
complex of facts and norms11 (but only as the result of a creative—both 
normative12
 and constructive13—act of the judicial forum taking a decision),14 
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8
 Since the classical topos by Ronald M. Dworkin’s ‘The Model of Rules’ University 
of Chicago Law Review 35 (1967), 14 et seq., his entire oeuvre seems to substantiate 
the underlying idea mostly in a constitutional context. 
 
9
 For a dissent in a similarly politicised mirror, see Bork, R. H.: Slouching towards 
Gomorrah Modern Liberalism and American Decline. New York, 1997. xiv + 382. Also 
cf., from the present author,   	


  ember? Korunk racionalizmusának 
dilemmái’ [Man elevating himself? Dilemmas of rationalism in our age] in Sodródó 
emberiség Tanulmányok Várkonyi Nándor: Az ötödik ember    [Human 
species drifting: On Várkonyi’s The Fifth Man] Katalin Mezey ed.  Budapest, 2000, 
61–93, in particular at  71–76. 
 
10
 Cf., above all, Alexy, R.: Theorie der Grundrechte. Baden-Baden, 1985, and, as 
built into a coherent theory, Pokol, B.: The Concept of Law The Multi-layered Legal 
System, Budapest, 2001, particularly ch. VIII,  90–106. For the overall debate, cf., e.g., 
Carl E. Schneider ‘State-interest Analysis in Fourteenth Amendment »Privacy Law«: An 
Essay on the Constitutionalization of Social Issues’ Law and Contemporary Problems 
1988/1, 79–121; Epp, Ch. R.: The Rights Revolution, Chicago—London, 1988; Koch, 
H.: ‘Constitutionalization of Legal Order’, Copenhagen, 1998. [a paper presented at 
the XVth World Congress of Comparative Law, Bristol]; Poplawska, E.: ‘Consti-
tutionalization of the Legal Order’ Polish Contemporary Law 1998/1–4, 115–133.  
 
11
 “For court purposes, what the court thinks about the facts is all that matters. 
For actual events […] happened in the past. They do not walk into the court.” Jerome 
Frank Courts on Trial Myth and Reality in American Justice, Princeton, 1949, 15. 
 
12
 See, e.g., most expressedly from Joachim Israel, ‘Is a Non-normative Social 
Science Possible?’ Acta Sociologica 15 (1972) 1, 69–87 and ‘Stipulations and 
Construction in the Social Sciences’ in The Context of Social Psychology A Critical 
Assessment, ed. J. Israel—H. Tajfel, London—New York, 1972, 123–211. 
238 CSABA VARGA  
similarly, neither the principles nor the rules are given in themselves, 
separated as such from each other in a way classified according to the law’s 
taxonomic systemicity as bearing their own, separate meaning. As is known, 
all this can only be the result of a creative act. Based upon the doctrinal 
study of law, which classifies the law’s notions by transforming them into a 
legal system, it is the judicial forum, exercising its authority while under-
taking its exclusive responsibility to decide, that builds different propositions 
into (or, properly speaking, uses them in its reasoning openly or implicitly 
as) either principles or rules, respectively. And, in parallel with this, it is their 
posterior analytical reconstruction
 that will also label them, interpreting 
the immense mass of normative regulations and reasonings used as just a 
raw material, as principles or rules.  
 Does the legal system itself have a structure, or is any structure taken 
into (or given to) it from the outside? And if it is taken, whoever is taking 
it? I think it would be absurd to give any kind of negative answer: how 
would it be possible to transplant any structure into something thought to 
be unstructured by itself? Or, for the sake of any reasonable answer, we have 
to hypothesise the legal system as being structured in itself. However, the 
questions “what is it?” and “what does it consist of?”, “how is it divided and 
into what?” and “what is the meaning of this all and of any of its structured 
components?”, as well as “what is the significance of its being structured?”—
well, all these depend already upon the sense given (or, more precisely, 
attributed) to law. 
 Formerly, in a somewhat similar context, I had already presented the 
figure of three partially intersecting circles. This was intended to prove, 
as against the normativist message of legal positivism (claiming that by 
means of norms alone one can bring about a medium of own existence, 
capable of effective operation in social practice), that the criteria for the 
law set when it has been made positive do not necessarily imply more than 
sheer manifestations of an intention that existed at the time of positivation. 
Therefore, the concern of what the law has been intended to be (i.e., to 
signify and represent) by its drafter(s) when it has been promulgated (e.g., 
in legislation) is not necessarily identical with the one of what and how 
the law is being formed into—when re-asserted, adapted, or ceased practically 
to exist—in either its official “application” (e.g., in judicial practice) or its 
                                                                                                                                               
 
13
 See, e.g., most forcefully, Hans Kelsen Reine Rechtslehre Einleitung in die 
rechtswissenschaftliche Problematik, Leipzig—Wien, 1934. 
 
14
 Cf., from the author, Theory of the Judicial Process, passim.  
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actual community practice respecting the unofficial and spontaneous, popular 
ways of customary proceeding as legal.15 
 Well, we can apply again the aforementioned figure (implying the 
practice of hermeneutical communities, giving and exchanging meanings) 
as reflected
 
to the issue of the internal structuring of the legal system 
itself, by placing the intersecting circles into a circle partly closed. [Figure] 
The reason for this is that the legislator may influence the decision to be 
taken by the legal and/or the social community on what is what amongst the 
possible structuring components of the legal system and also on what kind 
of one-sided or symmetrical connection is being implied by each of these 
in what type of horizontal or vertical context. However, we also have to 
bear in mind that, according to the nature of things, any creature of the 
legislator can exclusively become productive in the hands and through the 
understandings of its addressees as clients—as operated by its professional 
official administrator and/or the practice of non-professionals—by their 
standardising pattern which, as conventionalisingly re-asserted, may become 
organised as and integrated into social tradition. There is one considerable 
difference from the instance invoked above, relating to the theoretical 
understanding of facts, notwithstanding. Namely, the entirety of processes 
and interactions in question is mediated through and within the bounds of a 
legal doctrine, that is, by the conceptual sets and contexts of its prevailing 
dogmatics, constantly refined by both practitioners and prudents of the law, 
i.e., by a dogmatics that albeit mostly lacks officially established and formal 
qualities, yet exerts, by means of professional socialisation, a practically 
exclusive impact upon how the law, as explored and solidified in its 
internal system, is actually understood and practised. And no need to say 
that the more the legal processes (legislation and administration of 
justice) are practised and controlled by the legal profession, the more the 
doctrinal
 representation and mediation of the law prevails. 
 In consequence, it is not logic itself that labels anything as a structuring 
element identified either as a principle or as a rule, but we, who ponder, 
as the only possibility, always based upon the more or less successful 
comprehension of such a doctrine, projected through its re-consideration and 
reconstructive re-interpretation onto our given question, the mode of how 
to construct a sequence of distinguishing, deduction and justification, 
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15
 Cf., from the author, ‘Anthropological Jurisprudence? Leopold Pospíšil and the 
Comparative Study of Legal Cultures’ [1985] in Law in East and West ed. Institute of 
Comparative Law of the Waseda University, Tokyo, 1988, especially at 271–272 
[reprinted in his Law and Philosophy, 437–457]. 
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which seems to be utilisable and conclusive enough to convince those who 
control the issue we propose, in the procedural hierarchy. In doing so, we 
start from a practically optional formulation of normative language and 
reasoning (or from any expressions or even fragments of these), and within 
the boundaries of the internal ‘rules of the [legal] game’ (of how to proceed 
in identification, argumentation and induction/deduction, etc.) as established 
and re-confirmed by the legal profession in practice. 
 Of course, in practice all this appears as dynamism, and not as chaos; 
as openness to new issues, but by no means unforeseeability lacking any 
perspective. This assumes creative and constructive co-operation with norma-
tive force on behalf of all actors and, at the same time, also a community 
game processualised in formal sequences, as controlled in multiple ways 
many times; in which although equal chances are granted to everyone in 
principle, and anyone may innovate or deviate from earlier rules, yet anybody 
doing so not only has to give motives and justification for this, but also to 
derive this as inevitably resulting (even if not perceived and not practised 
by anybody so far) from the normative order which is continuously claimed 
to have remained untouched as a whole, and thereby again re-established 
and re-asserted (that is, re-conventionalised) in its overall arrangement.16 
 In a final conclusion, notwithstanding, in the long run and in their 
practical continuity, both the structuralisation of the legal system and the 
considerable stability of the way it is made up can be taken as granted. As 
opposed to the obvious architectural analogy in this case, our edifice is not 
built into one single construction by assembling components originating 
from different sources and made up of different elements—in architecture: 
bricks, mortar and plaster. On the contrary, we build and live the lawyer’s 
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16
 All this recalls the obvious parallel with the challenge of Euclid’s geometry by 
Bolyai and Lobachevsky. “From an external point of view […] the creation of »another 
new world« is manifest in the choice between equally eligible incidentalities and the 
presentation of the selected variant as perfect and logically necessary. […] This concerns 
conceptualisation, namely the fact that conceptual systems, be they as perfect as possible 
from an internal point of view or had they the most convincing explanatory force 
when describing the external world, can merely be regarded as mental experiments. They 
are nothing but games, which we make use of faute de mieux.” Varga Lectures, 38. 
 It is to be noted, however, that legal systems achieving a mature and balanced state are 
characterised exactly by the conscious institutionalisation of the ability of challenging the 
system from within the system (as an own judicial solution on account of gaps in the law 
unfillable otherwise, pursuant to, e.g., overruling precedents in England or § 1 (2) of the 
Swiss Zivilgesetzbuch), however, due to the self-disciplining force of the system, this does 
not proliferate in practice, being resorted to as a corrective measure only in the last resort.  
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profession using the only one material at our disposal, notably, language, in 
which words are selected to refer to concepts so that the suitable series of 
intellectual (logical) operations can be performed.17 Well, the question of which 
word stands in the place of what (the role it will be used in and what it 
will refer to in the given hermeneutical situation) depends, in addition to the 
language use socialised and conventionalised,18 in a direct sense exclusively 
on those who perform the intellectual (logical) operation in question. And the 
person concerned is involved as a hermeneutical actor in the given circles 
of communication, on the one hand, and, at the same time, is also an actor of 
some sociological situation, on the other, who, in average cases, will act in 
the way he is expected to, not exceeding the justifiable boundaries of his 
professional socialisation(s). 
 It can be established, therefore, that in our human world one acts amongst 
and as confronted with a huge number of various donnés crystallised in con-
ventionalised (and continuously re-conventionalising) tradition, that is, 
donnés
 that never stand by themselves as they are never freed from their 
humanly given meaning. Time after time construits are being generated out of 
these, for and to the benefit of man performing an action, which are going to 
be transmitted to his fellows and to the posterity, only to become a tradition 
which, in its turn, will be further handed down again merely in its quality 
as a donné.19 Well, if we inquire, in an ontological sense, about the continuity 
and practicality of these and the safety of their meaningful transmission, 
we can confirm that, throughout the historical process of conventionali-
sations, a kind of “tendential unity”20 can always be safely recognised—
both in the sense of the actuality of their functional correspondence to the 
overall social practice and of the reliability of their materialisation through 
speech acts. 
 All in all, my report has intended to present, as a basis, the elementary 
component of the idea underlying the questions set forth above, namely, 
the apparent paradox traceable in it, according to which structuring features 
in law are, in their massive incidence, construed/constructed and con-
struing/constructing at the same time, for they do not and cannot exist in 
and by themselves at all.  
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17
 For the stand of logic and conceptuality in human thinking, cf., from the author, ‘Az 
ellentmondás természete’ [The nature of contradiction, 1989] in his Útkeresés, 138–139. 
 
18
 Cf., e.g., Ost, F. : ‘Le code et le dictionnaire: Acceptabilité linguistique et validité 
juridique’ Sociologie et sociétés XVIII (avril 1986) 1, 59–75. 
 
19
 For the expression of François Gény, cf. Varga Lectures, 4. 
 
20
 For the expression of Georg Lukács, cf. Varga The Place of Law, ibidem. 
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